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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: 'The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ..., 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction[.]"2 This is an appeal from the final judgment 
of the Fourth District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provide that the Supreme Court may transfer any 
matter over which it has original appellate jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the lower court erred in signing an order prepared by opposing 
counsel awarding attorney's fees without proper notice, opportunity to be heard, and when 
they had not been awarded in the Court's original decision of the case months earlier? 
2. Whether the lower court erred by signing an order prepared by opposing 
counsel changing the Court's ruling to add "fraud" and "bad faith" when neither had been 
part of its original decision months earlier? 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. 
2Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended). 
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3. Whether the lower court denied the appellant due process by ruling, and then 
months later changing its ruling by signing an order prepared by opposing counsel without 
notice and an opportunity to challenge the changed findings in a new plenary hearing? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court should review the legal conclusions of the trial court (since this was a 
motion to dismiss it was resolved in toto upon legal conclusions) for correctness. "Generally, 
we review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according the trial court no 
particular deference." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P 11,54 P.3d 
1177, 1181 (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). 
2 
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure. Rule 1(f): 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a 
minute order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order 
for the payment of money may be enforced m the same manner as if it 
were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any 
order made without notice to the adverse party ma\ be vacated or 
modified by the judge who made it with or without notice. Orders shall 
state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the 
court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an 
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the 
prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, 
serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the 
court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within 
five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the 
proposed order upon being served with an objection cr upon expiration 
of the time to object. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 73(a) & (b)(l)-(4): 
(a) When attorney fees are authorized by contract or by law. a request for 
attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit or testimony unless the party 
claims attorney fees in accordance with the schedule in subsection (d) or in 
accordance with Utah Code Section 75-3-718 and no objection to the fee has 
been made. 
(b) An affidavit supporting a request for or augmentation of attorney fees shall 
set forth: 
(b)(1) the basis for the award; 
(b)(2) a reasonably detailed description of the time spent and work 
performed, including for each item of work the name, position (such 
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as attorney, paralegal, administrative assistant, etc.) and hourly rate of 
the persons who performed the work; 
(b)(3) factors showing the reasonableness of the fees; 
(b)(4) the amount of attorney fees previously awarded[.] 
Rule of Judicial Administration 4-504( [): 
(1) "In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall 
within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court 
a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling." 
Rule of Judicial Administration 4-505(1) & (2): 
(1) "Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court and 
set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed 
by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the 
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and 
affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services. 
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than attorneys, for 
time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
Plaintiff filed this action for eviction based upon the non-payment of construction 
services provided to Defendants. Before this eviction, Plaintiff had made written demand 
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for payment, had noticed up a foreclosure proceeding, had foreclosed, and had acquired title 
to the property through public auction. Throughout these activities, the Defendant did 
nothing. Only when an eviction proceeding had progressed to the point that an actual order 
to remove them from the property was threatened did the Defendants finally respond. A 
Motion to Dismiss the eviction proceeding was filed by Defendants and granted by the Court 
in a ruling from the bench. More than five months after the hearing Defendants filed a 
Proposed Order and included in that Proposed Order language ordering the payment of 
attorney fees and a finding of bad faith and fraud against the Plaintiffs. That Order does not 
reflect the determination of the Court as there had been no finding by the Court of bad faith 
or fraud, nor was there an award of Attorney fees asked for nor granted. Plaintiffs do not 
appeal the ruling that the matter be dismissed, but do dispute the award of attorneys fees and 
finding of bad faith and fraud. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
On or about March 12,2003, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this matter. See Court 
Record, p. 1-7. On or about March 19, 2003, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, See 
Ct. Rec. p. 11-69, which Plaintiff opposed. See Ct. Rec. p. 72-94. On June 13, 2003, 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing, at the conclusion of which, the lower 
court granted Defendants' motion. See Ct. Rec. p. 127, see also transcript of hearing 
attached hereto as Exhibit 1 in Addendum. In November, 2003, almost six months after the 
hearing, Defendants submitted their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and Affidavit Regarding Attorney Fees. See Ct. 
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Rec. p. 130-139. Plaintiff filed its Objection to the Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Award of Attorney Fees, preserving its right to appeal. See Ct. 
Rec. p. 140-142. On January 9, 2004, Plaintiffs Objection came on for hearing, which the 
lower court inappropriately titled an "Eviction Hearing." See Ct. Rec. p. 145. The lower 
court affirmed Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Award 
of Attorney Fees. See Ct. Rec. p. 145. On or about February 9, 2004, Plaintiff filed its 
Notice of Appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, see ct. rec. p. 155-157, which was 
subsequently transferred to this Court on or about February 20, 2004. See Ct. Rec. p. 163. 
Facts established in the Record below: 
1. The lower court never made any ruling awarding attorney fees in this matter, 
nor was such an award ever argued for nor even mentioned by the lower court during any 
portion of the hearing where the lower court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. See 
June 13th Transcript, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
2. The lower court never made any finding of bad faith, nor was it ever argued 
for, nor even mentioned by the lower court during any portion of the hearing where the 
lower court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. See June 13th Transcript, attached 
hereto as Exhibit 1. 
3. The lower court never made any finding of fraud, nor was it ever plead nor 
proven. See June 13th Transcript, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
4. Defendants did not submit an order within the 15 days required by Rule 4-504 
of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, rather it, along with a surprise Affidavit of 
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attorney fees, was filed almost six months after the lower court made its ruling. See Exhibits 
2, 3, and 4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Plaintiff does not dispute that their action should be dismissed, however, they 
do dispute that extra findings and awards, which were never a part of the ruling of the lower 
court, should be included. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a]n 
order includes every direction of the court[.]" See Ut. R. Civ. Proc. 7(f)(1). That rule 
requires that a party include only the directions of the court, and not innovations of the 
attorney preparing the order. Defendants included a finding of fraud and bad faith in their 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neither of those issues were ever discussed, argued, 
or presented to the lower court. And most especially, the lower court never made any ruling 
where such a finding was decided. It was improper for Defendants to include such a 
finding, and error for the lower court to affirm such a finding. Furthermore, Defendants 
included an award of attorneys fees and costs in their Proposed Order. That was never 
discussed, argued, or presented to the lower court. Neither did the lower court make any 
such award. To include such an award was improper, and for the lower court to affirm the 
award, six months after the ruling, was error. 
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2. The law of the case was made at the time the lower court made its ruling on the 
motion to dismiss. The law of the case at that time was only that the Plaintiffs action should 
be dismissed. Inclusion of such additional findings and awards violates the law of the case 
and was erroneous. 
3. Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, as well as current 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, require that orders of the court be submitted 
within 15 days of the ruling of the court. Defendants failed to submit any proposed order 
or any other document for almost six months after the lower court made its rulings. That 
was in direct violation of those rules, for which it would be appropriate to have those 
submissions stricken and to allow Plaintiffs counsel opportunity to submit their own. 
4. Even assuming for the sake of argument that this Court accepts the untimely 
and incorrect findings of fact and conclusions of law, order, and attorney fee affidavits to 
somehow be valid, the attorney fee affidavit does not comply with the requirements set forth 
in either Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration nor the current Rule 73 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore it must be stricken. 
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ARGUMENT 
In March of 2003, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss an action previously filed 
by Gordon Case & Company to foreclose upon certain property. In June of 2003, hearing 
on that motion was held in the Orem Department of the Fourth District Court, with Judge 
Backlund presiding. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Court granted Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and requested that they prepare an order memorializing that ruling. See 
Transcript of June 13, 2003 hearing, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Addendum to this brief 
(hereinafter, "June 13th Transcript"), p. 15. Defendants did not present any order to the 
Court with regard to that ruling until November, 2003, almost six months later. Not only 
was the timeliness of their presentation in violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure, but they 
additionally included findings of fraud and bad faith and made an award of attorneys fees, 
none of which were a part of the Court's ruling in June. Although Plaintiff objected to the 
form of the order, the Court affirmed Defendants' untimely and incorrect order in January, 
2004. Those terms were not a part of the Court's prior ruling and should not have been 
affirmed in Defendants' January 2004 order. 
I. Defendants' Proposed Order Goes Beyond the Direction of the Lower 
Court and Violates the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that: "An order 
includes every direction of the court[.]" See Ut. R. Civ. Proc. 7(f)(1). In this case, although 
the order potentially included every direction of the Court, it also included several directions 
of Defendants' creation. The Court in making its ruling in June, 2003 stated that "[t]he only 
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thing before this Court is a motion to dismiss. The Court finds that the grounds are well 
taken and grants the motion." See June 13th transcript, p. 15, In. 1-3. The Court went further 
to state, "And request the defendants to prepare an order dismissing the complaint in 
accordance with the arguments raised in your motion." Id., at In. 5-7. Those are the 
instructions of the Court. 
There is no instruction of the Court allowing for or awarding attorney fees, nor was 
it ever mentioned during any portion of the hearing. (See June 13th transcript). 
Nevertheless, Defendants' Order, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 to the 
Addendum, makes an award of attorney fees. There was no instruction of the Court making 
a finding of bad faith or fraud, nor were either of those ever argued during any portion of 
the hearing. (See June 13th Transcript). Nevertheless, Defendants' Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law include specific Conclusions of Law, that "Plaintiff fraudulently and 
in bad faith commenced this action." See Defendants' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, which are attached hereto as Exhibit 3 in the Addendum, p. 3, In.6. 
Those actions do not comply with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That 
rule specifically requires that the order of the Court should contain the directions of the 
Court. There was no direction of the Court to award attorney fees, nor were they asked for 
nor mentioned at any point in the hearing. To add them at Defendants' own discretion is 
inappropriate and violates the Rules of Civil Procedure. There was no direction or finding 
of bad faith or fraud, nor was either specifically plead as is also required by the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to add them at Defendants' own discretion was inappropriate. For the 
10 
Court to, eight months after the hearing, affirm them without that ruling having been made 
was error and violates the law of the case. 
II. Defendants' Order Violates the Law of the Case. 
The "law of the case" doctrine specifies that when a legal "decision [is] made on an 
issue during one stage of a case," that decision "is binding in successive stages of the same 
litigation." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995) (citation 
omitted). This is true even if the lower court "believe[s] that the issue could have been better 
decided in another fashion." Id. This, however, appears to be exactly what the lower court 
has done. Although an award of attorney fees was not made, nor were findings of fraud or 
bad faith made or even argued, it included those terms in its order. That violates the law of 
the case doctrine, was in error, and should be reversed. 
III. Defendants5 Order Should Be Stricken for its Untimely Submission. 
Defendants' order and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should also be 
stricken for their untimeliness. Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that an order be submitted within 15 days of the ruling of the Court. See Ut. R. Civ. Proc. 
7(f)(2). Plaintiff recognizes that portion of the rule was recently adopted. That same 
language however, was included in Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 
prior to its removal from there and placement in the Rules of Civil Procedure. In any event 
the requirement was and is the same. This Court has routinely dismissed appeals of court 
orders to which there was no timely objection. See e.g., Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 180 
(Utah 1998). The same standard should be held true for the remaining requirements of the 
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rule. In this case, Plaintiff is not appealing the dismissal of the case, what is being appealed 
is only the inclusion of language that was disingenuously and independently added by 
Defendants. There was no finding of bad faith, as it was never argued. There was no 
finding of fraud, as it was never argued. Neither did the Court ever address the subject of 
attorney fees, nor make any such award. It was improper and each of those terms should be 
removed from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal, 
respectively. 
IV. Defendants' Attorney Fee Affidavit is Insufficient, Does Not Comply with 
the Rules of Judicial Administration, and Should Therefore Be Stricken. 
Even assuming arguendo that this Court can affirm the award of attorney fees despite 
the fact that no such award was actually made, the attorney fee affidavit submitted by 
Defendants' counsel does not meet the requirements set forth in the Rules of Civil Procedure 
and therefore must be stricken. 
The calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be overturned absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). However, an award made without 
adequate supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be overruled. Id.; 
Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). While findings of fact are 
unnecessary in connection with summary judgment decisions, a summary judgment is 
improper when material facts are disputed. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163,168 
(Utah Ct.App. 1989). Essentially, the lower court, because it relied upon affidavits and 
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evidence from both parties, did not dismiss this case pursuant to a motion to dismiss, rather, 
summary judgment was granted. "[WJhere attorney fees are awarded to a prevailing party 
on summary judgment, the undisputed, material facts must establish, as a matter of law, that 
(1) the party is entitled to the award, and (2) the amount awarded is reasonable." Id. at 169. 
First, Defendants never established to the lower court or in any other manner that they were 
entitled to an award of attorney fees. Rather, they just simply submitted an order with that 
award. That can never constitute establishing entitlement. Secondly, Defendants have not 
shown that the award is reasonable, even if it were proper. Plaintiffs believe the award was 
outrageous, and certainly not reasonable. 
Under rule 4-505(1) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Affidavits in 
support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court and set forth specifically 
the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by the attorney, the number 
of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter 
to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees 
for comparable legal services. 
In this case, Defendants' affidavit sets forth no legal basis for the award, rather it 
refers to Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, which does not provide 
a basis, but rather sets forth the requirements. That is not sufficient. In Hall v. NACM 
Intermountain, Inc., 988 P.2d 942 (Utah 2001), the Supreme Court held that because both 
the court and counsel were aware of the legal basis for seeking attorney fees, there was no 
prejudice from a failure to state a legal basis in the affidavit. In this case, however, nobody, 
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not the lower court, nor the Plaintiff were ever aware of any legal basis for seeking attorney 
fees. The subject was never even broached by any party during the hearing on this matter. 
There certainly is prejudice where a party surprises another with an unsubstantiated award 
of attorney fees six months after a court's ruling, where such an award had never been made. 
Plaintiff can acknowledge that the attorney fee does detail hours spent, however, 
nowhere in the affidavit does it specify what rates are being applied, nor who performed the 
work. What makes it even more difficult to examine is that the rates differ from item to 
item. No court could sufficiently determine the reasonableness of any portion of that fee 
given what is provided in the affidavit. 
Nowhere in the affidavit does it affirm the reasonableness of the fee as is required by 
the rule. This is the affidavit's chief failing. The fees charged were not reasonable for the 
work performed. Nor does it specify what work was performed by persons other than 
attorneys as is required by the rule. In essence, the affidavit violates every requirement of 
the rules. It should therefore be stricken. 
Rule 73(a) & (b)(l)-(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the following: 
(a) When attorney fees are authorized by contract or by law, a request for 
attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit or testimony unless the party 
claims attorney fees in accordance with the schedule in subsection (d) or in 
accordance with Utah Code Section 75-3-718 and no objection to the fee has 
been made. 
(b) An affidavit supporting a request for or augmentation of attorney fees shall 
set forth: 
(b)(1) the basis for the award; 
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(b)(2) a reasonably detailed description of the time spent and work 
performed, including for each item of work the name, position (such 
as attorney, paralegal, administrative assistant, etc.) and hourly rate of 
the persons who performed the work; 
(b)(3) factors showing the reasonableness of the fees; 
(b)(4) the amount of attorney fees previously a warded [.] 
Those requirements are substantially the same as the requirements set forth in Rule 4-505 
of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. The only requirement of Rule 73 Defendants 
complied with was a listing of the hours and work performed. But it doesn't say who 
performed the work, what hours what person worked, what rates were charged, whether or 
not the person is an attorney, associate attorney, paralegal, what experience the person has 
in the practice, or any other reasonably required detail. The affidavit, along with the 
unsubstantiated award of attorney fees was improperly presented, and furthermore is so 
deficient as to require it to be stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellant respectfully requests this 
Court reverse the error made by the Fourth District Court in this matter and require the Court 
to enter an Order which follows the actual decision of the Court. The award of attorney's 
fees and the finding of bad faith should both be stricken from the final Order of the lower 
Court. 
15 
DATED this ( day of December, 2004. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Attbrnby for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage prepaid, 
on the following: 
James Tucker Hansen 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORELEY LLC 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
1 on this ( day of December, 2004. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Transcript June 13, 2003, hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
2. Defendants' "Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." 
3. Defendants' "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
4. Defendants' "Affidavit Regarding Attorneys Fees." 
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and MARY HELEN WEST, an 
an individual, 




Electronically Recorded on 
June 13, 2003 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JOHN C. BACKLUND 
Fourth District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: Denver- Snuffer 
For the Defendant: 
NELSON/SMU FFBR/DAHLE/POULSEN 
10585 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801)57 6-1400 
James Tucker Hansen 
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801)756-7658 
Transcribed by . Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South VJashington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-0027 
EXHIBIT 
-2-
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on June 13, 2003) 
3 THE COURT: Okay, we have a hearing on a motion to 
4 dismiss. It's oral argument. Gordon Case and Company, a Utah 
5 business entity, plaintiff, versus Arnold West and Mary Helen 
6 West. Do we have the attorneys present on that? 
7 MR. SNUFFER: Mr. Snuffer here in Court with the 
8 plaintiff. 
9 THE COURT: Good morning. 
10 MR. SNUFFER: Good morning. 
11 THE COURT: And is there an attorney present for the 
12 defendant, either Casey Wright or Mr. Tucker Hansen? 
13 MR. SNUFFER: I have not seen either of them, and it's 
14 their motion, so we'd ask that it be denied. 
15 THE COURT: Well, I think we owe them the courtesy of 
16 finding out if they're en route or something. I would do that 
17 for you, Counselor. 
18 MR. SNUFFER: Sure. 
19 THE COURT: So we'll take a brief recess. We'll have 
20 the clerk call them to see if they're planning to be here. 
21 Thank you. 
22 (Recess taken.) 
23 THE COURT: Pending oral argument on a case, I think 
24 Counsel for the other side is en route. So as soon as they 
25 arrive we'll take care of that. 
-3-
1 MR. SNUFFER: We called their local office and they 
2 weren't there. They called down to I think the American Fork 
3 office. I'd be v;illir.c he v;aive oral argument. 
4 THE COURT: Well, are they en route, as far as you 
5 know? 
6 COURT C1ERR: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: I think they'll -- they'll be here soon. 
8 (Court addresses other matters unrelated to this case) 
9 THE COURT: Okay. I see that Counsel is here on our 
10 civil case that I said we would handle. So I'm sorry, iadies, 
11 but they were going to go first. So let me do that and then 
12 we'll come back to this case. 
13 FEMALE ATTORNEY: That's fine. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. All right. We'll have Counsel come 
15 up, please, Mr. Hansen and Mr. Snuffer, en oral argument on the 
16 defendant Arnold and Mary 'West's motion to cismiss. Mr. Hansen 
17 represents Mr. and Mrs. West. Mr. Denver Snuffer represents 
18 Gordon Case and company, the plaintiff. 
19 I've read through the entire file. Counsel, as 1 
20 understand it -- you can, you know, correct me if I'm wrong --
21 but the position of the defendants is basically they were 
22 buying this real property in American Fork pursuant to a 
23 Uniform Real Estate Contract, and apparently there was a 
24 warranty deed placed in escrow at that time from Mrs. West's 
25 mother, as I understand it. 
-4-
1 MR. HANSEN: That's correct, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: And then Mr. Case alleges that he or his 
3 company did some work on the property, and that he alleges that 
4 he wasn't paid, and then he alleges that his wife, as trustee 
5 for a trust created by the mother of Mrs. Case and Mrs. West 
6 -- they're sisters -- that she ultimately became the trustee, 
7 and then that in her position as trustee she conveyed the 
8 property that is the subject of this lawsuit to Mr. Gordon 
9 -- to Mr. Case's company because he wasn't paid for work on 
10 Mr. and Mrs. West's property. 
11 In looking at the file, that -- on November l5', 2000 
12 that trust deed was recorded in behalf of Gordon Case and 
13 Company, and I don't know if that was the original trust deed 
14 or that was a successor trust deed where Mr. Snuffer, acting 
15 as the trustee executed a trust deed to Mr. Gordon Case and 
16 Company. ] 
17 I think on that very same date is the date that Judge 
18 Gary Stott in the quiet title action in Provo quieted title in 
19 Mr. and Mrs. West on the same day; is that true? 
20 MR. SNUFFER: Correct. 
21 THE COURT: What a coincidence. Well, Mr. Hansen, I'll 
22 listen to your argument and then I'll listen to Mr. Snuffer's 
23 argument. 
24 MR. HANSEN: Thank you, your Honor. I will be very 
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the law as I understand it, Gordon Ca 
it subject to whatever the outcome of 
the lis pendens was filed. 
So the outcome of that litigation was that we got 
our quiet title granted, that property was transferred to my 
client, and therefore -- if you look at it there is a parcel o 
property that Gordon Case and Company took an interest in, and 
that partially includes two sub-parcels that rny clients now 
own. 
So as to the rest of the parcel of property, I 
anticipate that, you know, Gordon Case and Company may have 
a right to that --
THE COURT: I realize that this was originally one 
larger piece of property that was -- part of it was sold 
pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract to Arnold and 
Mary West. 
1 MR. HANSEN: That's correct. There were two parcels — 
2 sub-parcels that were sold off of that. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. HANSEN: So they take it -- you know, when you have 
5 a trust deed like that they take an interest in it subject to 
6 the outcome of the Court proceedings. The outcome of the Court 
7 proceedings quiet titling my clients, and so therefore they 
8 have no interest in that property. That's the position. 
9 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. Snuffer, I'll listen 
10 to your argument, then. 
11 MR. SNUFFER: What they've filed is a motion to dismiss 
12 and although we don't think any evidence can be taken under the 
13 rules dealing with the motion to dismiss, since they submitted 
14 evidence and we submitted evidence, but we think that the 
15 standard requires you to read the complaint and to ask the 
16 question whether any stated facts might be proven which would 
17 give the plaintiff entitlement to relief. That's the legal 
18 standard under the rule. 
19 The plaintiff not only performed improvements on 
20 the property, the plaintiff also paid taxes on the property. 
21 At the moment that the trust deed was given, the plaintiff 
22 would have been entitled alternatively to take the trust deed 
23 to get more time for them to pay for the improvements, file a 
24 mechanic's lien on the property for having made improvements, 
25 or do nothing and sue in contract. 
We dc not think, chat", the lis pendens has any effect 
2 on the validity of the trust: deed, becaute at. the moment the 
3 trust deed was given, she was of record title hoillno the 
4 property, and it's not necessary in that setting for tnere to 
5 be anything etner than a colorable presence on the grant of 
6 relief. 
7 At tnts point the question we think is wt..;e they aware 
of the indebtedness, wnich they were. They saw the improvements 
9 going up. They were present on the property at the tir.e of the 
10 improvements. We supplied an affidavit ana photographs of the 
11 improvements t.nai were made. 
12 They were the beneficiaries of the payment o: the 
13 taxes by my client, and with the standards apply tc a motion 
14 to dismiss, we have a right to go forward and. prove a set of 
15 facts in which they had actual notice of these events as they 
16 occurred, in which they were making promises tc maKe a payment 
17 on this stuff and ]ust have never done it. My client after 
18 years of waiting has gotten tired of it. 
19 That earlier action involving the --
20 THE COURT: Were you the one that — 
21 MR. SNUFFER: -- quiet title --
22 THE COURT: Were you the one that acted as the grantor 
23 -- or signing on behalf of the grantor that issued the trustee 
24 deed to Gordon Case and Company on the very same day that Judge 
25 Stott quieted title in favor of Mr. Hansen's clients? 
1 MR. SNUFFER: No, I am a successor trustee. 
2 THE COURT: So you're the successor trustee. 
3 MR. SNUFFER: I was not the one at the time. However --
4 THE COURT: Do you want to comment on that coincidence; 
5 the fact that the Judge issued a ruling on that day quieting 
6 title in his clients to the property --
7 MR. SNUFFER: I don't think there was one --
8 THE COURT: -- and then Mrs. Case issued a deed that 
9 very same day to her husband' s company? 
10 MR. SNUFFER: Correct. I think that was intentional. 
11 I don't think it was coincidental. It preceded the entry of 
12 the order in order to preserve --
13 THE COURT: So it was designed to beat Judge Stott's 
14 order, then? 
15 MR. SNUFFER: Well, it was designed to have the lien 
16 preserved so that as the title moves over to the other party 
17 in that action --
18 THE COURT: It didn't move to them. He just confirmed 
19 that it was their — they had title to the property. It didn't 
20 move to them on that day. He was just confirming that between 
21 these combatants, they had the superior right to the title. 
22 I MR. SNUFFER: She was -- she was the record title 
23 | holder — 
24 I THE COURT: Based on their complaint. 
25 I MR. SNUFFER: -- until the Judge signed the order 
1 changing the record title holder from her -- or from the trust, 
2 rather, to someone else, and she is the trustee of the trust, 
3 intended to record that cocument before the entry of the order 
4 so that more time would be granted --
5 THE COURT: Well, isr.'t thai fraud? 
6 MR. SNUFFER: I think not. It vas not the subject of 
7 I the earlier litigation. The earlier litigation dealt with the 
question of the trust --
9 I THE COURT: Okay. Then she conveyed whatever interest 
10 she had -- the trust had in the property tc Mr. Case, which as 
11 of that day was zero, because the Judge quieted title in his 
12 client's name. 
13 MR. SNUFFER: The rules --
14 THE COURT: She didn't convey anything because she 
15 didn't have anything to convey. 
16 MR. SNUFFER: Chronologically what occurred was 
17 the conveyance, and then the order that changed the title. 
18 Chronologically the entry of the trust deed preceded quiet 
19 title. 
20 THE COURT: But the Judge had decided that their claim 
21 to the title was superior to the trust claim to the title. 
22 MR. SNUFFER: But the Judge was never confronted with 
23 the improvement to the property. 
24 THE COURT: Which should have been part of that lawsuit 
25 then. You're claiming payment of a debt and using the property 
-10-
1 as collateral, and they're talking about title to the property 
2 involving the same exact parties, and you never brought it up. 
3 Why? That seems kind of odd to me. 
4 MR. SNUFFER: The improvements that were made were not 
5 connected to the then pending litigation. The then pending 
6 litigation dealt with interests under the trust. It dealt with 
7 an inter-family dispute over who was entitled to --
8 THE COURT: Yeah, payment of a debt. It's over payment 
9 of a debt for improvement to property. 
10 MR. SNUFFER: That's what the trust deed was for. 
11 THE COURT: And you never filed a mechanic's lien. You 
12 never filed a collection case. You just went ahead and filed a 
13 deed that gave her all right and title to the property. 
14 MR. SNUFFER: No, we filed a deed that gave her a lien 
15 that amounted only to $9,000, a portion of which has been paid 
16 before the --
17 THE COURT: But that's why we have the mechanic's lien 
18 section, is to file a lien against somebody else's title, and 
19 if they don't pay the lien off they have it sold to pay the 
20 lien. 
21 MR. SNUFFER: And I understand that, but these are 
22 family members --
23 THE COURT: Well, this is just a way to subvert the 
24 mechanic's lien statute. 
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If they had filed a mechanic's lien, a foreclosure 
would have been required within a period of months thereafter. 
They have waited years now in the expectation that "hey would 
get paid, and now :hey are forced to take the necessary --
THE COURT: I'm net deciding whether he should or 
shouldn't get paid. I don't think that's the issue of the 
motion to dismiss. That's really not the issue. This is 
an issue where Gordon Case and Company is seeking to evict 
Arnold and Mary Helen West from their heme. It's an eviction 
proceeding. 
MR. SNUFFER: This is now. 
THE COURT- Yeah, that's what this case is, is an 
eviction proceeding. 
MR. SNUFFER: Correct. 
THE COURT: And it turns out that they actually 
have superior title to the property to the plaintiff. Res 
judicata. A Judge has said, "You have title to the property," 
and quieting title, which mean these various claimants, and you 
have the superior title. It's yours. 
MR. SNUFFER: And one of the arguments that is raised 
and one of the issues that is raised in their complaint that 
they have asked to dismiss is an estoppel argument against them 
-12-
1 for having waited too long to bring the action to resist here. 
2 They knew all along of the steps that were being taken 
3 to collect on the debt. They were aware of the existence of 
4 the debt. They have made promises about payment on the debt, 
5 and we wind up all the way to an eviction proceeding with them 
6 for the very first time taking some steps to resist it. 
7 J I'd ask the Court to leave the case pending if for no 
other reason than to cure that argument. You can't come after 
9 a foreclosure, after a notice of eviction, after a suit filed 
10 to perfect the eviction, and for the first time raise arguments 
11 that could and should have been raised much earlier. 
12 THE COURT: You can't foreclose someone's property 
13 in a trustee's deed where the trustee had no interest in the 
14 property to convey to the grantee. She had no interest to 
15 convey to the grantee. Judge Stott had ruled that way; that 
16 the trustee of the trust had no interest in the quiet title 
17 action, so she conveyed nothing. 
18 It's just like me granting a deed to Disneyland to 
19 Tom Jones down the street and saying, "Go ahead, they owe me 
20 25 bucks. I'm going to give you a deed to Disneyland and you 
21 j can sell it in three months after notice to pay the debt. 
22 | MR. SNUFFER: I understand. 
23 I THE COURT: So what good does it do? 
24 MR. SNUFFER: I understand the argument, but my view is 


























as the record title owner, she had ~he right to enter the lien, 
and they knew that that lien v;:is there. They've known it from 
the beginning, and they've done nothing --
THE COURT: But --
MR. SNUFFER: eitiner in that actio: 
THE COURT: 3ut whether they did or didn't know I think 
is immaterial. If it means nothing, you know, you can't; convey 
what you don't own. So the Court's going to grant the motion 
to dismiss. 
Counsel, this is crystal clear to me. We have a Court 
case involving these exact parties on that exact issue of who 
has title to the property. A Judge hears the case. A Judge 
enters the ruling. A Judge even orders her to convey a deed 
to them conveying all interest of the trust back to Mr. and 
Mrs. West. 
She refuses to do that, so the Judge reserves 
jurisdiction for the Court to issue the deed, and the Court 
issues the deed. She wouldn't issue the deed pursuant to his 
order. So he -- the Judge, through the Court issues a deed. 
They record it. The title was quieted then. When she conveyed 
title to their property, she had no interest to convey. 
MR. SNUFFER: The question of --
THE COURT: So whether there's a debt or not is 
immaterial. You can't evict someone from property that they 
own and that they have title to. 
-14-
1 MR. SNUFFER: The question of the payment for that 
2 debt, including the payment of the taxes has never been subject 
3 of any litigation in any form. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 MR. SNUFFER: And I would ask that that would be — 
6 THE COURT: That may have been a good way -— you know, 
7 why didn't he pursue this? I don't know. I can't answer that. 
8 Why didn't he file a mechanic's lien or --
9 MR. HANSEN: I can probably answer that. 
10 THE COURT: — file a debt to collect on the judgment. 
11 MR. SNUFFER: Well, if 1 may be allowed to finish my 
12 statement, rather than dismiss, I would ask that we be given 
13 leave for an opportunity to amend our action here to make it 












heretofore unlitigated debt paid by my clients. The benefit of 
which went exclusively to the defendant either in contract or 
in (inaudible), because they should be given a day in Court on 
that. 
THE COURT: Well, if they -- why weren't those listed 
as causes of action, then, in the complaint? 
MR. SNUFFER: Because we assumed the validity of the 
trust deed and all of the steps taken under the trust deed. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm not going to grant •-- there's 
no pending motion to amend the complaint. There's no motion 



























-- differing causes of action. The only thing before this 
Court is a metier, to dismiss. Tho Court finds that the grounds 
are well taken ar.c grants the mot: on. 
MR. HANSEN: Can I address that, ycur Honor? 
THE COURT': And request the defendants to prepare an 
order dismissing the complaint in accordance with the arguments 
raised in your motion. 
MR. HANSEN: Mr. Snuffer had indicated that because 
this is a motion to dismiss that it shouio just be taken on 
the face of the pleadings, but I believe the Rules of Civil 
Procedure are clear that if --
THE COURT: Well, yeah. 
MR. HAMSEN: — additional evidence is presented — 
THE COURT: I know. If you raise son"? thing and they 
have -- the burden falls back on them to come back and rebut 
that. 
MR. HANSEN: I think it should be treated based on 
the fact that the way that both parties have pied this as a 
motion for summary judgment. I'm looking for a dismissal with 
prejudice, because we have submitted affidavits. They've seen 
the affidavits. 
THE COURT: It is a dismissal with prejudice on that 
claim, on the claim, set forth in the complaint. It's dismissal 
with prejudice on that claim. Thank you very much. Counsel. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE 01 UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
GORDON CASE & COMPANY , a Utah ) 
business entity, ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, ) 
) Civil No. 030200433 
vs. ) 
) Judge John C. Backlund 
ARNOLD WEST, an individual, and ) 
MARY HELEN WEST, an individual, ) 
Defendants. ) 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court in accordance with Rule 
4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Defendants having moved the Court for 
dismissal against the Plaintiff, Gordon Case & Company, a Utah business entity, and the Court 
having reviewed the pleadings on file herein and all memorandum presented by the parties, the 
Court having found that the Plaintiffs Complaint is without merit and was brought in bad faith, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss against the Plaintiff, Gordon Case & Company, a Utah business entity, is 
hereby granted. Furthermore, the Defendants are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in the sum 
of $3,121.50; with interest to accrue on said total judgment from August 5, 2003, at the statutory 
post judgment rate of 3.41% until paid in full, and after accruing costs. This Judgment shall be 
augmented in the amount of reasonable attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by 
execution or otherwise as shall be established by Affidavit. 
DATED this day of , 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN C. BACKLUND 
Fourth District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
DEEEND ANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS in an envelope, postage prepaid, this ^ / ^ d a y of 
((Jfiht/JL, , 2003, to the following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
James "Tucker" Hansen, Bar No. 5711 
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HANSEN WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON. P.C. 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
GORDON CASE & COMPANY, a Utah | FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
business entity CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 030200433 
ARNOLD WEST, an individual, and 
MARY HELEN WEST, an individual, 
Judge John C. Backlund 
Defendants. 
After hearing the evidence presented in the motion to dismiss hearing and after 
reviewing the memorandums filed by the parties, the Court hereby enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In early 1987, the Defendants, Arnold and Mary West, entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract with Georgia Lamar West for the purchase of the property in dispute in the case 
at bar (hereinafter referred to as "the property"). Georgia Lamar West is Defendant Mary 
West's mother and Arnold Joseph West is Mary's husband. 
2. Contemporaneous with the execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, Georgia 
Lamar West executed a warranty deed in favor of the Defendants on April 8, 1987. 
3. Shortly after entering into the Uniform Real Estate Contract with Georgia Lamar West, 
the Defendants moved into the house located on the property and have lived there ever 
since. 
4. Georgia Lamar West had other real property that she put in trust. Claudia Case 
(wtPlaintiff') was designated as the trustee of that trust. Mrs. Case is and has been at all 
times relevant to this lawsuit the wife of Gordon Case, who is the owner of the business 
that is the Plaintiff in the case at bar. 
5. A dispute arose between Mrs. Case as the trustee of the Georgia Lamar West Trust and 
the Defendants regarding the property at issue in this lawsuit. 
6. On or about December 22, 1999, the Defendants filed a Complaint against Mrs. Case, 
individually, and as Trustee that included a quite title*claim for the property. 
7. Defendants also filed a Notice of Lis Pendens on the property on or about December 22, 
1999. 
8. On or about October 2, 2000, the Honorable Gary Stott of the Fourth District Court 
issued a Memorandum Decision in the case (#990404457) between the Defendants and 
Mrs. Case. Judge Stott's decision quieted title in the property to the Defendants. 
9. Judge Stott's memorandum decision was put in order form and signed by him on or about 
November 1, 2000. The Order stated that Mrs. Case is "ordered to execute and deliver a 
proper Warranty Deed" to the Defendants within 10 days of the date of the Order. The 
Order further stated that if the Warranty Deed was not executed and delivered to the 
Defendants within 10 days of the Order, then the Court was authorized to execute and 
deliver the Warranty Deed on behalf of Mrs. Case. 
10. On or about June 6, 2001, the Court executed and delivered to the Defendants the 
Warranty Deed on the property. 
11. On or about November 1, 2000, the same day Judge Stott signed the Memorandum 
Decision quieting title in the property to the Defendants, Mrs. Case executed a trust deed 
in the property to Gordon Case & Company. Gordon Case & Company eventually 
foreclosed on the property and purchased it at the trustee's sale. 
12. On or about March 12, 2003, Gordon Case & Company served a Five Day Notice to 
Vacate the property and filed an Unlawful Detainer Complaint against the Defendants. 
13. The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Unlawful Detainer Complaint on or about 
March 19, 2003 on the grounds that the Plaintiff did not have an interest in the subject 
property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter and the parties herein. 
2. The Defendants are the rightful owners of the property. 
3. The Plaintiff does not have an interest in the property because the person it purchased the 
property from did not have an interest in the property. 
4. The Plaintiffs trust deed foreclosure and sale of the property did not give the Plaintiff an 
interest in the Defendants' home. 
5. The Defendants did not lose their property rights by not opposing the Plaintiffs 
foreclosure on the trust deed. 
6. The Plaintiff fraudulently and in bad faith commenced this action. 
DATED this day of , 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
John C. Backlund 
Fourth District Court Judge 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW in an envelope, postage prepaid, this S i day of £kUl!i£JJ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
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ARNOLD WEST, an individual, and 




Civil No. 030200433 
) 
: ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
KASEY L. WRIGHT, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says: 
1. That I am one of the attorneys for the Defendants in the above-entitled matter. 
2. That this firm performed work in connection with the preparation and presentation 
of this case having a reasonable value of Three Thousand One Hundred Twenty One and 50/100 
Dollars ($3,121.50). 
3. That the time spent on this case was for the following work on which the following 
amount of time was expended. 
Date Work Performed Time 
3/11/03 Research criminal section for false 5-day 
notice; telephone conference with Vince 
Rampton; review order and real estate contract .90 
3/12/03 Review Documents; follow up .80 
3/13/03 Follow up in Case matter; telephone conference 
with client; research county recorder's records 
regarding notice to Gordon Case .60 
3/14/03 Research at law library regarding lis pendens 






3/17/03 Follow up ; meet with clients and associate 
Regarding preparing motion to dismiss 
03/17/03 Work on Motion to Dismiss 
3/18/03 Work on Motion to Dismiss 
3/19/03 Prepare and draft Motion to Dismiss 
3/19/03 Review and revise Motion to Dismiss; follow up 
file with Orem court .90 
03/26/03 Follow up with Bruce Murdock regarding 
legal description 
04/03/03 Review Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 
04/04/03 Conference with clients regarding reply 
04/07/03 Draft Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 2.60 
04/10/03 Work on Reply 
05/13/03 Follow up in Case matter 
























05/21/03 Prepare Supplemental Affidavit 









Work on Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law 
Work on Motion to Dismiss Order; Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Research slander of title damages 







Work on slander of title and damages memo 1.30 
Draft memo regarding slander of title damages .90 
Draft memo regarding slander of title damages .80 











Total Fee $3,121.50 
4. That Defendants are entitled to have Judgment for attorney's fees, pursuant to Rule 
4-505 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, incurred in connection with this case in the total sum 
of THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE AND 50/100 DOLLARS ($3,121.50). 
DATED this ) 2 day of August, 2003. 
KAS^Y L. WRIGHT 
, ... ,Jih , SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this IZ ^ dav of August, 2003. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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